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A decision maker is characterized by two binary relations. The rst reects decisions that are
rational in an \objective" sense: the decision maker can convince others that she is right in
making them. The second relation models decisions that are rational in a \subjective" sense:
the decision maker cannot be convinced that she is wrong in making them. We impose axioms
on these relations that allow a joint representation by a single set of prior probabilities. It is
\objectively rational" to choose f in the presence of g if and only if the expected utility of f is
at least as high as that of g given each and every prior in the set. It is \subjectively rational"
to choose f rather than g if and only if the minimal expected utility of f (relative to all priors
in the set) is at least as high as that of g.
JEL classication: D81
Keywords: Rationality, Multiple Priors1 Introduction
1.1 Reasoned choice
Consider a policymaker who has to make a decision such as the determination of environmental,
economic, or foreign policy. The decision maker wishes to know what her policy should be.
That is, she constructs her preferences in as rational a way as she can.
Economic theory typically assumes the existence of a binary relation %, reecting preferences
between pairs of alternatives, acts, or courses of action. When consumer theory is discussed,
this relation is most commonly interpreted descriptively, assumed to reect the consumer's
preferences, as revealed by her choices. It is almost a truism that this relation is complete,
namely, that between any two courses of action, f and g, we will observe f % g or g % f.1
Moreover, the leading interpretation of the relation % is of a preference that exists without a
complicated reasoning process.
By contrast, a decision maker such as a government ocial who seeks to determine environ-
mental policy does not necessarily have pre-dened preferences %. Rather, she is in the process
of determining these preferences. In the terms of Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2004,
2007) the relation % in this problem reects \reasoned choice" rather than \raw preferences".
Correspondingly, it is not obvious that such a relation may be assumed complete. At the end
of the reasoning process completeness should better be satised, or else the decision maker will
be caught in indecision. But at the outset completeness typically does not hold. Well-dened
preferences are the goal, not the data.
1.2 Two notions of rationality
We submit that standard models in decision theory, using a single binary relation %, are too
austere to describe the process by which a decision maker generates her preferences. Such
models are also not rich enough to distinguish between choices that the decision maker feels
strongly about, and choices that are made out of necessity.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the standard model in a modest way, upgrading it to
have two binary relations as primitives, rather than one. These two relations would distinguish
between preferences that are based on sound reasoning and those that are not necessarily
so. Clearly, a pair of binary relations is also too limited to describe the dynamic process of
generating preferences, or an entire dialog between policymakers and their consultants. But
a model with two relations will allow us to capture more of the subtleties of decision under
uncertainty, without losing too much in terms of parsimony.
1The completeness axiom is not vacuous, as it implicitly requires that the same choices will be made under
the same conditions. However, it cannot be refuted by a single choice between two alternatives, whereas other
axioms typically can be refuted by a single observation of the preference between any pair of alternatives
involved.
11.2.1 Objective rationality
Let one binary relation, %, denote preferences that are rational in the objective sense: when
we write f % g, we mean to say that the decision maker can be convinced that act f is at
least as desirable as act g. That is, this preference can be justied and defended on more or
less objective grounds, given the decision maker's goals, values, and desires.2 If the decision
maker seeks expert advice, the relation % would reect the preferences that the advisor could
derive, using logical, statistical, and decision-theoretic reasoning, from the decision maker's
utility, data, and his own expertise.
The informal denition of \objective rationality" revolves around the ability to convince
others. We wish to focus on the ability to convince based on sound arguments, rather than on
rhetorical ruses or personal style. It is therefore useful to think of \being convinced" as saying
\being convinced and being able to convince others in turn". That is, the relation f % g
can be read as saying \the decision maker nds f at least as desirable as g, and she also feels
quite condent that she can convince any reasonable person that, according to her utility, f is
indeed at least as desirable as g." For example, if the decision maker would hire an assistant,
she believes that the latter would see the logic behind the decisions described by %.
Unfortunately, in many decision problems under uncertainty, a relation % that can be
interpreted as \objectively rational" would fail to be complete. There will typically be many
pairs of acts f and g between which no well-reasoned preferences exist. Even if the decision
maker's utility function is clearly dened, absence of information is likely to leave the decision
maker unable to logically justify preferences that depend on plausibility judgments. Indeed,
the scientic method allows us to settle many questions of belief, but it has to remain silent on
others.
How should the theory of decision under uncertainty cope with the challenge posed by
incompleteness? One approach is to make do with an incomplete relation. According to this
approach, if there is no compelling reason to prefer f to g nor g to f, we might be better o
explicitly modeling this absence. Models of incomplete preferences date back to Aumann (1962),
Kannai (1963), and Peleg (1970). Walley (1981) and Bewley (2002) focused on incompleteness
that is due to uncertainty, namely to the absence of an agreed-upon probability. Such models
have recently received renewed attention (cf. Ok, 2002, Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok, 2004,
Mandler, 2005, Evren and Ok, 2007, Nehring, 2008, Ok, Ortoleva, and Riella, 2008). Many
of these authors have also argued that there is nothing irrational about incompleteness of
preferences. In the absence of information, it appears more rational to be silent than to pretend
to have knowledge that one does not have.
2We use the term \objective" in a highly qualied way. See subsection 3.4 below.
21.2.2 Subjective rationality
Despite the arguments for allowing incompleteness, the standard justication of the complete-
ness axiom for rational choice still remains: eventually, a decision will be made. If we do not
describe this decision in the model, we might be left with a very well-reasoned relation % that
has little to do with actual decisions. The relation % might be the epitome of rationality, while
the decisions that will be taken in practice fail to satisfy basic consistency requirements such
as transitivity. An expert who derives the relation % for a decision maker might be appalled
to learn what follies were allowed by his cautious analysis.
We are therefore led to introduce a second binary relation, ^ %, which we expect to be
complete. The relation ^ % will reect preferences that are rational in the subjective sense: when
we write f ^ %g, we mean to say that the decision maker cannot be convinced that choosing f in
the presence of g is wrong. Intuitively, such a choice does not lead to any contradiction with
other choices of the decision maker, and does not seem illogical given the decision maker's goals
and the data available to her.
Thus subjective rationality is also dened by the ability to convince others. But it does not
require that the decision maker be able to convince others that she is right, only that others
will not be able to convince her that she is wrong. Should the decision maker hire an assistant,
she may not be certain that he would come up with the choices reected in ^ %; but she feels






are analogous to the classical and the Bayesian approaches to statistics,
respectively. Classical statistics aspires to objectivity, at the price of completeness. When a
hypothesis H0 is rejected by a scientic study, it is expected that any reasonable person would
nd H0 incompatible with evidence. This high standard of objective rationality has the obvious
implication that in many cases neither a hypothesis H0 nor its negation H1 can be rejected.
Seeking objectivity, science has to remain silent on many issues.3
Bayesian statistics, by contrast, has a well-dened probability for any event of interest. In
this sense, it obeys the completeness axiom: it can state, for any hypothesis and given any
data base, whether, given the evidence, the hypothesis is more or less likely than its negation,
and, indeed, precisely how likely it is. Such likelihood judgments cannot be derived based on
evidence and logical reasoning alone, and therefore they cannot be expected to be shared by
all. Hence, Bayesian statistics depends on a subjective prior.
3Rather than the statements made by science, one may consider science's choice among the three alternatives,
\state H0", \state H1", and \remain silent". In this meta-problem we may consider complete preferences, where
\remain silent" is the preferred choice unless one of the hypotheses may be rejected. When classical statistics
is used for decision making, preferences are often completed by resorting to a default such as the status quo.
31.2.4 Analogy: law
The distinction between the two relations, % and ^ % is reminiscent of that between criminal
and civil law. Criminal law requires that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, a
verdict of \guilty" can be read as \judging the defendant to be guilty is preferred, in the sense
of objective rationality, %, to acquitting him". It is expected that the court be able to convince
others that such a verdict was indeed justied. It is accepted, however, that questions of guilt
may remain doubtful. In other words, what can be legally \proven" denes an incomplete
relation %. This incomplete relation is completed by the default of a \not guilty" verdict.4By
contrast, civil cases are more symmetric in their treatment of the two parties involved. In the
absence of an obvious default, an incomplete order is unsatisfactory, as it does not specify the
court's ruling. Thus, the decision in a civil case can be thought of as a complete order, which
may be less robustly justied than a decision in criminal case. That is, as compared to criminal
law, civil law is closer to subjective rationality, ^ %, than to objective rationality.
1.3 The role of axioms
Decision theory oers sets of axioms that are shown to be equivalent to particular represen-
tations of preferences. For example, a complete and transitive relation over a nite set can
be represented as maximizing a certain utility function. The literature also oers a variety
of axiomatic models for decision making under uncertainty. Most notably, building on ideas
of Ramsey (1931) and de Finetti (1937), Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963)
provided axiomatic models of subjective expected utility maximization. These models are of-
ten interpreted descriptively, as supporting the claim that economic agents can be modeled
as expected utility maximizers, relative to their subjective probabilities. In this paper we
are mostly interested in the normative interpretation of such models, supposedly helping the
decision maker to determine what her preferences should be.
1.3.1 Normative role of universal statements
There are at least two rather dierent ways in which axioms can be normatively interpreted. The
rst is as general mathematical conditions, and the second { as specic instances of preferences.
Consider, for example, the transitivity axiom. One might consider a hypothetical dialog with
a decision maker, in which a decision theorist says, \Consider the claim that, for every three
choices, f, g, and h, if you prefer f to g and also g to h, you should prefer f to h.5 Wouldn't
you like to satisfy it? Wouldn't you feel uneasy with ever be found to violate it?" If the
4This is a little dierent from the default choice of \remain silent" in science. The law is committed to treat
\not proven guilty" and \proven innocent" in the same way, whereas science should better not treat \not proven
false" as equivalent to \proven true".
5For simplicity, we use \prefer" instead of \prefer or nd equivalent".
4decision maker is sophisticated enough to understand this type of general statement, involving
a universal quantier over the variables f, g, and h, she might say, \I adopt this axiom. I would
hate to nd myself violating it." Then the decision theorist can, as it were, ash a slide with
a representation theorem, and say, \Well, if you agree with this axiom, and your preference is
complete, you have to maximize a utility function. It's a theorem. Now wouldn't it be simpler
to try to estimate your utility function for each alternative?" That is, the decision theorist
uses a set of axioms, viewed as abstract universal statements, to convince the decision maker
that she should adopt a particular model of decision making. The axioms do not necessitate
preference between any two particular choices f and g; they only impose a general structure
on the totality of the decision maker's choices.
1.3.2 Normative role of concrete instances
By contrast, axioms such as transitivity can also be interpreted in a concrete way, as building
blocks in a reasoning process. For example, assume that a consultant tells the decision maker,
\If I recall correctly, we have already determined that f is preferred to g. Moreover, last week
you have chosen g over h. Now it would seem to me that, if you put these two decisions together,
you should also prefer f to h." In this type of reasoning, f, g, and h are particular choices.
The decision maker does not engage in an abstract argument with variables and universal
quantiers. Rather, she is shown the logic of the axiom in a particular instance.
In the concrete interpretation, axioms are viewed as \reasoning templates", namely as ways
to use arguments for some preferences in order to construct from them arguments for other
preferences. If one were to model this process formally, one could consider particular instances
of preferences as propositions, and decision theoretic axioms as \inference rules", allowing the
concatenation of such propositions to generate the formal object of a \proof".6
1.3.3 Comparison
When axioms are interpreted as universal statements, they demand a rather high degree of
sophistication on the decision maker's part. Relatedly, when the decision maker is asked to
judge the plausibility of axioms in the abstract, she is susceptible to \framing eects": an
axiom may appear more or less compelling depending on its representation. Moreover, an
axiom that is logically stronger may be more compelling than an axiom that is weaker. For
example, the axiom, \there should be no cycles of strict preference" is probably more compelling
than the axiom \there should be no cycles of strict preference of odd length."
The concrete interpretation, by contrast, requires less abstract thinking, and leaves less
room for dierent representations of the same statement. Correspondingly, in the concrete
interpretation the set of preferences than can be derived from an axiom increases with its
6Observe that the decision theoretic axioms are the inference rules, not the \axioms" as used in propositional
logic.
5logical strength: a more general axiom will allow a larger set of preferences to be deduced from
it.
Perhaps the most important distinction between the two normative interpretations of axioms
is that the universal one often does not help the decision maker in determining her preferences,
only their structure. They deal with form rather than with content. For example, assume
that a decision maker wonder whether a certain policy to cope with global warming is to be
adopted. She consults an expert who convinces her of the logic of Savage's axioms, viewed as
universal statements. Then she is told that, by a mathematical theorem, she should have a
utility function and a probability measure, and she should maximize her subjective expected
utility. But this general conclusion says nothing about which utility function she should choose,
or about which subjective probability she should adopt. In particular, she was just convinced
that she should be able to quantify the probability of the globe warming up by at least 2 degrees
over the next ve years. But nothing tells her what these beliefs of her should be.
By contrast, the concrete interpretation of the very same axioms would take some preferences
that the decision maker already has, and build up from them some others. There is no guarantee
that this process will end up with a complete relation, but it will typically have more pairs of
choices (f;g) in it than the relation that the process started out with.
Yet another distinction between the two interpretations has to do with the scope of the
preference relation. Most axiomatic derivations of decision models require a rather rich domain
of preferences for the proofs of the theorems to hold true. These may include choices between
implausible alternatives. By contrast, the concrete interpretation of axioms requires choices
between concrete alternatives that are actually available, and some variations thereof, but
typically not between all conceivable pairs of choices.
While the rest of this paper can be read with more than one interpretation in mind, we
try to adhere to the concrete interpretation, which we nd more conducive to actual decision
making processes than the universal one. We imagine the decision maker as starting with some
preference propositions and building up to generate new ones. However, which are the initial
preference propositions, and which axioms should be used as inference rules would depend on
the interpretation of the preference order as reecting objective or subjective rationality.
1.4 The present model
In this paper we present a model that makes two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume
that the decision maker has a well-dened utility function, so that she has a rather clear idea
how she would trade-o various goals, what her ethical constraints are, and so forth. Her main
diculty is how to deal with uncertainty. Second, we assume that, should the decision maker
consult with experts, her utility function is honestly adopted by them. Thus, we abstract
away from the problems discussed in the recent literature on strategic consultants (see, for
instance, Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, Prendergast and Stole, 1996, Levy, 2004), and ask a
6simpler question: how should the decision maker and her consultants work together to obtain
the most rational decision (for the decision maker) in the face of uncertainty?
Our focus is on situations where probabilities are neither given, nor can they be easily de-
duced or estimated. As mentioned above, the works of Ramsey (1931), de Finetti (1937), Savage
(1954), and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) famously championed the Bayesian approach, sug-
gesting that any uncertainty can be reduced to risk using the notion of subjective probabilities.
The latter are dened behaviorally, as degrees of willingness to bet, embedded in a model of
expected utility maximization.
Many statisticians were opposed to this line of reasoning,7 and Ellsberg's (1961) well-known
experiments have shown that people often fail to behave in accordance with the Bayesian
approach. In the 1980's two models were proposed, relaxing the axioms underlying subjective
expected utility theory and generalizing it by allowing a representation of beliefs by a set of
probabilities, rather than by a single probability. These approaches are often referred to as
multiple prior models, and they tend to be closer to the classical statistics mindset, in which
a set of distributions denes the inference problem, but no prior belief over the set can be
assumed. One approach (Bewley, 2002, see also Walley, 1981) uses the set of priors to dene a
partial order by unanimity: f is at least as desirable as g if and only if the expected utility of
f is at least as high as that of g for each and every prior in the set.8 The other (Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 1989) retains the completeness axiom, and derives a representation by the maxmin
rule: f is preferred to g if and only if the minimal expected utility of f, over all possible priors
in the set, is higher than the minimal expected utility of g.




, interpreted as objective and subjective ra-
tionality relation, as suggested above. Formally, we assume that the rst satises the axioms
of Bewley (2002),9 and the second { of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). This means that each
relation can be represented by a set of priors: % by unanimity, and ^ % by the maxmin rule.
However, the two sets of priors are unrelated. They may be dierent or even disjoint. We
therefore introduce two additional axioms, explicitly relating the two relations, and show that
these axioms hold if and only if the two sets of priors are indeed identical. Taken together, the
axioms imply the existence of a set of priors that represents both % and ^ % simultaneously:
the former via unanimity, and the latter { via the maxmin rule.
7See Cifarelli and Regazzini (1996), who describe Cantelli's reactions to de Finetti's ideas as \... speaking to
Cantelli about subjective probability ... was tantamount to pulling a tiger by its tail." See also Knight (1921)
and Keynes (1921).
8Bewley's model dealt with a strict preference, represented by a strict inequality for each prior. Mathemat-
ically, it relied on Aumann (1962).
Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (1995) oer a model in which preferences are described by sets of
probability-utility pairs. A derivation of Bewley's result in a purely subjective probability set-up is provided in
Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (GMMS, 2003).
9As explained below, our formulation diers from Bewley's on several minor points: it is closer to those of
Shapley and Baucells (1998), GMMS (2003), and Girotto and Holzer (2005).
7We describe the axioms and results in the next section. As a by-product, we oer a version
of Bewley (2002) that deals with a general state space. This facilitates the comparison with
the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) model, but may also be of interest in its own right. Section
3 is devoted to a discussion. In particular, it argues that the present treatment highlights
the extremity of the maxmin rule, and suggests alternative notions of subjective rationality.
Specically, we also mention a variation in which the subjectively rational relation is Bayesian,
that is, a model in which objective rationality is dened by unanimity with respect to a set of
probabilities, but subjective rationality is dened by a Bayesian approach relative to a single
probability in this set. We conclude with general discussions of rationality and the related
literature.
2 Model and Results
2.1 Preliminaries
We use a version of the Anscombe and Aumann (AA, 1963) model as re-stated by Fishburn
(1970).
Let X be a set of outcomes. The set of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM, 1944) lotteries is
L =
(
P : X ! [0;1]

   
#fxjP(x) > 0g < 1;
P
x2X P(x) = 1
)
:
and it is endowed with a mixing operation: for every P;Q 2 L and every  2 [0;1], P + (1  
)Q 2 L is given by
(P + (1   )Q)(x) = P(x) + (1   )Q(x) 8x 2 X:
The set of states of the world is S endowed with an algebra  of events. The set ()
of (nitely additive) probabilities on  is endowed with the event-wise convergence topology.10
The set of (simple) acts F consists of all simple measurable functions f : S ! L. It is endowed
with a mixture operation as well, performed pointwise. That is, for every f;g 2 F and every
 2 [0;1], f + (1   )g 2 F is given by
(f + (1   )g)(s) = f(s) + (1   )g(s) 8s 2 S:
The decision maker is characterized by two binary relations % and ^ % on F, denoting
objective and subjective rational preferences, respectively. The relations , , ^ , ^  are
dened as usual, namely, as the asymmetric and symmetric parts of % and ^ %, respectively.
We extend % and ^ % to L as usual. Thus, for P;Q 2 L, P % Q means fP % fQ where, for
every R 2 L, fR 2 F is the constant act given by fR(s) = R for all s 2 S and % is either %
or ^ %. The set of all constant acts is denoted by Fc.11
10A net fpkg converges to p if and only if pk (A) ! p(A) for all A 2 .
11We sometimes abuse the notation writing R instead of fR and L instead of Fc.





for all P 2 L.12 Thus, if the decision maker chooses f 2 F and Nature chooses s 2 S, the





2.2 Several basic conditions
We now turn to discuss the axioms. It will be convenient to start with axioms and conditions
that both relations are assumed to satisfy. As discussed in the introduction, completeness will
not be among these conditions, as it is not a natural requirement when objective rationality is
concerned.
The following conditions are stated for a generic relation %. They will be imposed on both
relations % and ^ %.
Basic Conditions:
Preorder: % is reexive and transitive.
Monotonicity: For every f;g 2 F, f(s) % g(s) for all s 2 S implies f % g.
Archimedean Continuity: For all f;g;h 2 F, the sets f 2 [0;1] : f + (1   )g % hg and
f 2 [0;1] : h % f + (1   )gg are closed in [0;1].
Non-triviality: There exist f;g 2 F such that f  g.
2.2.1 Reexivity
In general, reexivity is a matter of notation more than a substantive axiom: it does not say
much about the decision maker's preferences. Rather, it reects the modeler's choice to use the
language of weak rather than strong preferences. However, it is important to observe that the
language of preference, in which the dialog between the decision maker and her consultants is
assumed to take place, does not have a term for strict preference. For example, we may nd
that f % g but not g % f. In our (standard) notation, this implies that f  g. Yet, it will
be inappropriate to read this relation as \the decision maker can be convinced that f is strictly
preferred to g". All we can say is that \the decision maker can be convinced that f is at least
as good as g. She cannot be convinced of the fact that g is at least as good as f." The latter
statement diers from the former. In particular, the proposition \f is strictly preferred to g"
cannot be stated in the language of the discussion.
12One may replace L by any convex subset of a vector space, or even any mixture space, and EPu with the
evaluation at P of an ane function u on L. All our results remain valid:
9To see a concrete example, assume that there are two states of the world. The payos
guaranteed by f are (1;0) and by g { (0;0). There is no information about the probability of
the states. It should be relatively easy to convince the decision maker that f % g. (In fact,
this will also follow from the monotonicity axiom.) Clearly, a reasonable decision maker will
not be convinced of the converse. Hence f  g. But the decision maker cannot be convinced
that f is strictly better than g. Should she think about it, she might say that it is possible
that the probability of state 1 is zero, and then the two acts are equivalent. But the logical
reasoning we have in mind does not have strict preference as a primitive of the language.13
2.2.2 Transitivity
Transitivity of objective rationality is rather compelling. If a consultant has a compelling
argument that f should be at least as desirable as g, and another { that g should be at least as
desirable as h, transitivity suggests that these two arguments can be concatenated to generate
a compelling argument for concluding that f is at least as desirable as h. In a more formal
model, one could model each such argument as a proof, namely, an ordered list of propositions,
each one following from its predecessors, and the transitivity axiom would be an inference rule
generating a longer proof (that f % h) from two shorter ones (of f % g and g % h).
Next consider subjective transitivity. In this case, the preferences f ^ %g and g^ %h need not
be compelling. They may well be nearly arbitrary decisions that the decision maker made,
shrugging her shoulders, simply because a decision was called for. Hence, if the consultant
starts an argument with \clearly, f is at least as good as g", the decision maker might stop
him and say, \It's not so clear. I made this decision and I know exactly what went into the
decision process. It was, in fact, a rather arbitrary decision I made under time pressure. Let's
not build theories around it." At this point the consultant might say, \OK, so maybe it was
arbitrary. But if you make arbitrary decisions to choose f in the presence of g, and g in the
presence of h, but refuse to choose f because h is available, you'll be in trouble. Just imagine
the headlines. Hence, my best advice to you is to now choose f. Even if the rst two preferences
were arbitrary, the very fact that they were made indicates a certain commitment."
We therefore assume transitivity both for objective and for subjective rationality. We nd
that transitivity is compelling enough, as an inference rule, to be valid even if the preference
statements on which it relies were not fully justied.
2.2.3 Monotonicity
In general, monotonicity is also a condition of internal coherence: it says that if certain prefer-
ences hold, then others should hold as well. In the present case, the antecedent has to do with
a preference between the vNM lottery obtained by f to that obtained by g at each and every
13The model can be further elaborated, allowing strict preferences for objective and subjective rationality to
be explicitly part of the preference statements.
10state, whereas the consequent is the preference between f and g. As in the case of transitivity,
this axiom appears powerful enough to be a valid inference rule even if its input, namely the
statewise preferences between vNM lotteries, may not have been fully justied.
However, we assume that the utility function is given and agreed-upon. Hence the pointwise
preference f(s) % g(s) needs no justication, and it is not a matter of arbitrary choice either.
Given a utility function, an expected utility of the lottery f(s) that is no lower than that of
the lottery g(s) can be viewed as \hard evidence" that at state s, f is at least as good as g.
This evidence calls for no further justications. And using it, a simple inference suggests that
f % g for both notions of rationality.
2.2.4 Continuity
The Archimedean continuity axiom is the standard Herstein and Milnor (1953) continuity
axiom. It cannot be directly refuted by nitely many observations, and its scientic stature is
therefore dubious. It is therefore common to dismiss such axioms as a matter of mathematical
necessity and discuss them no further.
We mention in passing that, in the context of the construction of preferences and the
rhetorical arguments involved in it, axioms such as continuity may be elevated to a more
conceptual realm. For instance, if a decision maker can express a preference f  g only
at the cost of a discontinuity somewhere in her preferences, she might be convinced that it
makes more sense to have g % f. However, we assume that the decision maker only conducts
explicit reasoning in the language of weak preferences, and such an interpretation would be
inappropriate in our model. It is therefore more natural to think of the continuity axiom as
part of the discussion among decision theorists rather than the discussion between the decision
maker and her consultants.
Be that as it may, this standard continuity axiom is be assumed for both relations.
2.2.5 Non-triviality
The non-triviality axiom is a condition designed to rule out the case in which the decision maker
might be ascribed a constant utility function. In this case the representation results hold, but
the uniqueness results do not: preferences can be represented by a constant utility function and
any beliefs whatsoever (whether beliefs are represented by a single probability measure, a set
thereof, etc.). Thus, the non-triviality axiom is part of the theoretical discussion rather than
the discussion between the decision maker and her consultants. In fact, rather than stating an
explicit axiom, one could add a caveat at the end of the representation theorems, qualifying
the uniqueness statement.14 Since the two relations will be assumed to agree on constant acts,
14The tradition, following Savage's axiom P5, is to state an explicit axiom to rule out the special uninteresting
case of trivial preferences. This practice reminds us that the project of elicitation of beliefs from observed choices
is predicated on the existence of non-trivial preferences.
11both will satisfy this axiom as soon as the utility function is not constant.
2.3 Axioms for objective and for subjective rationality
We now turn to discuss the axioms that are specic to objective or to subjective rationality.15
2.3.1 Completeness
C-Completeness: For every f;g 2 Fc, f % g or g % f.
Completeness: For every f;g 2 F, f ^ %g or g^ %f.
As discussed above, subjective rationality is required to be complete, because eventually
some decision will be taken. Objective rationality, by contrast, is not necessarily complete,
because one may not have compelling reasons to determine preferences between certain pairs of
alternatives. However, we do require that objective rationality be complete when restricted to
the subset of constant acts. C-completeness veries that the incompleteness of the objectively
rational relation % is not due to any diculties that the decision maker might have about
determining her preferences under certainty. That is, we are not faced with a decision maker
who can't decide whether she prefers chocolate to vanilla ice cream in terms of their immediate
hedonic value. Any incompleteness of preferences will therefore be attributed to uncertainty
about future outcomes of the options involved. (See Subsection 3.5 below.)
2.3.2 Independence
Independence: For every f;g;h 2 F, and every  2 (0;1),
f %
 g i f + (1   )h %
 g + (1   )h:
C-Independence: For every f;g 2 F, every h 2 Fc, and every  2 (0;1),
f ^ %g i f + (1   )h^ %g + (1   )h:
We thus require that objective rationality satises the original AA independence axiom,
whereas subjective rationality { only the weaker version referred to as C-Independence. The
reason is the following: if the preference between f and g is based on objective, perhaps
even scientic reasoning, i.e., f % g, this very preference may be used as a reason to prefer
f + (1   )h to g + (1   )h. That is, if preference propositions only refer to preferences
that can be \proven", then they are sound enough to build upon, and the independence axiom
used by Anscombe and Aumann is a reasonable inference rule. If all reasonable decision makers
15Since each of the following axioms will be assumed for one relation only, we state them directly in terms of
this relation, rather than in terms of an abstract relation % as above. In the sequel, we allow ourselves to use
phrases such as \C-Completeness" and \% satises C-Completeness" interchangeably.
12would accept that f is at least as good as g, they should also accept that f + (1   )h is
at least as good as g + (1   )h. This reasoning may also be reversed: if there are good,
sound reasons to prefer f + (1   )h to g + (1   )h, one may argue that there are even
better reasons to prefer f to g: if a small step from h \towards" f is better than taking the
same step \towards" g, continuing in the respective directions presumably only strengthens
this preference. In short, the basic intuition of the classical independence axiom is assumed to
be compelling when one restricts attention to justied preferences.
This is not the case when subjective rationality is concerned. In this case, the relation
f ^ %g may follow from more arbitrary considerations, or from lack of information. For example,
assume that there are two states of the world, and that f = (1;0) and g = (0;1). The decision
maker has no information about the probability of the two states, and therefore the objective
rationality relation does not rank them. Having to make a decision, the decision maker might
shrug her shoulders and decide that they are equivalent, namely, that f ^ g, due to symmetry.
Next consider the mixing of f and g with h = f. For  = 0:5, the mixture g + (1   )h
completely hedges against uncertainty, leaving the decision maker with a risky act. The mixture
of f with h = f clearly leaves the decision maker with f, without any reduction of uncertainty.
The decision maker might plausibly argue that f +(1 )h is not equivalent to g+(1 )h.
Indeed, the former is uncertain whereas the latter { only risky. A consultant might try to
construct a \proof" that the two are equivalent, starting with \Don't you recall that you said
that f and g were equivalent on your eyes? All we're doing now is to mix both of them with
h!" But the decision maker might counter, \Wait a minute, when I said that f and g were
equivalent, I didn't know they were, I only used a default decision. This is not the kind of
decision you can now construct a new theory upon." \Aren't you concerned that you will be
perceived as irrational?" the consultant might ask. \Leave this to me" would be the response;
\I barely understand this mixture operation of yours and if my worst sin is that f ^ g but
g + (1   )f ^ f, I can live with that."
By contrast, we maintain that C-Independence is a reasonable inference rule even if the
preference propositions are not fully justied. The reason is that mixing f and g with a
constant act h can be viewed as a change of scale on the expected utility axis, namely, adding a
constant and multiplying by a positive constant. Hence a decision maker might be embarrassed
to simultaneously express preferences such as f ^ %g and g +(1  )h^ f +(1  )h. Each of
these may be a possible decision on its own, but if h is a constant, the conjunction of the two
appears inconsistent.
Clearly, certain decision makers will nd Independence a reasonable condition for both %
and ^ %, while others may nd that even C-Independence is too strong for both. How many
decision makers actually accept Independence for % and (only) C-Independence for ^ % is an
empirical question. For that reason, the following results are only an example of the way the
two notions of rationality can be modeled.16
13We will resort to an additional axiom:
Uncertainty Aversion: For every f;g 2 F, if f ^ g, then (1=2)f + (1=2)g^ %g.
The uncertainty aversion axiom has been introduced in Schmeidler (1986, 1989) for the
subjective preference ^ %, and it says that the decision maker prefers \smoothing out" acts, re-
placing potential uncertainty about the states of the world by objective risk about the outcomes
to be obtained in each and every state. To be more concrete, imagine that a decision maker
expressed the preference f ^ g. This choice might have been due to symmetry considerations,
and it might have been completely arbitrary as well. However, the consultant may now ap-
proach the decision maker and say, \If you express preference f ^ (1=2)f + (1=2)g, it would
appear as if you like the uncertain situation. That is, you could have reduced the dependence
on unknown probabilities, but you preferred not to. It's ne for a gambler, but it doesn't look
very good for a public gure like yourself."
As in the case of C-independence, this reasoning may or may not convince the decision
maker. Our focus in this paper is on decision makers who do accept this reasoning, namely,
decision makers who nd Uncertainty Aversion a reasonable inference rule for subjective ratio-
nality propositions. Decision makers who do not accept it might be modeled by more general
decision rules, as in Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (GMM, 2004).
The Uncertainty Aversion axiom has no counterpart for objective rationality, because it
is implied by the standard Independence axiom of AA, which is assumed to be satised by
objective rationality.
To conclude, objective rationality, %, satises versions of axioms that appeared in Aumann
(1962), Bewley (2002), GMMS (2003), and Girotto and Holzer (2005). Subjective rationality,
^ %, satises the axioms of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
2.4 Representation of objective and of subjective rationality
2.4.1 Representing partial orders
We remind the reader that objective rationality is assumed to be reexive. As observed above,
in the presence of incompleteness, results stated in terms of reexive relations may not have
immediate counterparts in terms of irreexive relations and vice versa. A brief explanation
may be in order.
Aumann (1962) assumed a reexive relation, corresponding to our %. He dened a \utility"
for % to be a function that respects both strict preference  and indierence . That is, if
U : F ! R is an Aumann-utility for %, we have
f 
 g , [f %
 g;:g %
 f] ) U(f) > U(g)
16For example, C-Independence can be weakened as in the variational preferences of Maccheroni, Marinacci,
and Rustichini (2006). In this case we expect that in Theorem 3 a variational representation would hold for ^ %.
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f 
 g , [f %
 g;g %
 f] ) U(f) = U(g):
Aumann proved that such utilities exist, but he did not provide a characterization of %.
Clearly, one does not expect a single utility function to fully characterize incomplete preferences.
But a set of utilities might provide a joint characterization. In particular, one may consider a
\multiple utility" representation by a set of functions U such that
f 
 g , [8U 2 U U(f) > U(g)] (1)
or
f %
 g , [8U 2 U U(f)  U(g)]: (2)
Bewley (2002) considers as primitive a strict preference relation, that is, an irreexive one,
and provides a characterization as in (1), where each U is an expected utility functional relative
to a certain prior. Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (GMMS, 2003) provide
a representation as in (2), and this is also the approach we adopt here. Thus, we begin with
a reexive order as does Aumann (1962), but seek a complete characterization as provided in
Bewley (2002).
Using a reexive relation as primitive makes some of the results simpler to state. As opposed
to Bewley's model, we do not assume a nite state space, and our results are not restricted
to sets of probabilities that are all strictly positive. However, it is important to observe that
in our case strict preference would not imply strict inequality for each and every representing




8U 2 U U(f)  U(g)
9U 2 U U(f) > U(g)
#
: (3)
If we were to consider a decision matrix in which rows correspond to elements of F and columns
{ to functionals U in U, the representation we obtain, (3) corresponds to weak dominance,
whereas Bewley's, (1) { to strict dominance.
2.4.2 Unanimity representation of objective rationality
The axioms we imposed on % deliver a unanimity representation. Our rst result extends
Bewley (2002) to an innite state space (see discussion in Section 3.6).
Theorem 1 The following are equivalent:
(i) % satises the Basic Conditions, C-Completeness, and Independence;
(ii) there exist a non-empty closed and convex set C of probabilities on  and a non-constant










 dp(s) 8p 2 C
: (4)
15Furthermore, in this case C is unique and u is cardinally unique.17
Remark 1 There is a natural trade-o between Archimedean Continuity and Independence.
Theorem 1 holds unchanged if we replace Archimedean Continuity with the stronger:
(a) For all e;f;g;h 2 F, the set f 2 [0;1] : f + (1   )g % h + (1   )eg is closed in
[0;1].
and Independence with the weaker:
(b) For every f;g;h 2 F, and every  2 (0;1), f % g implies f +(1 )h % g+(1 )h:
2.4.3 Maxmin representation of subjective rationality
The axioms we imposed on ^ % deliver a maxmin rule.
Theorem 2 (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989, Theorem 1) The following are equivalent:
(i) ^ % satises the Basic Conditions, Completeness, C-Independence, and Uncertainty Aver-
sion;
(ii) there exist a non-empty closed and convex set C of probabilities on  and a non-constant
function u : X ! R such that, for every f;g 2 F









Furthermore, in this case C is unique and u is cardinally unique.
2.5 Relating objective and subjective rationality
We now come to discuss the relationship between the two orders.
2.5.1 Consistency
Consistency: f % g implies f ^ %g.
Consistency seems to be rather compelling given our interpretation of the two relations: if
there are sound, objective reasons to weakly prefer f to g, we will not allow the decision maker
to exhibit the preference g^ f. The choices of the decision maker cannot contradict evidence
or logical reasoning. If an expert can prove that f is at least as good as g, given the decision
maker's goals, the decision maker should obey this conclusion.18
17We say that u is cardinally unique if it is unique up to a positive linear transformation.
18See Nehring (2000,2008) for similar reasoning.
16This axiom can also be viewed as part of the denition of subjective rationality: intuitively,
we argued that it is subjectively rational to prefer f to g if the decision maker cannot be
convinced that she is wrong in exhibiting such a preference. One way in which the decision
maker can be proven wrong is by pointing out internal inconsistencies to her. Indeed, the
axioms imposed on ^ % rule out such potential embarrassments. However, the decision maker
can be proven wrong also directly, namely, if there are compelling, objective reasons to exhibit
the opposite preference. Viewed thus, the consistency axiom complements the denition of
subjective rationality, making sure that the decision maker will be proven wrong neither by
internal inconsistency nor by external inconsistency.
Consistency can also be viewed as a reasoning template, or as an inference rule, provided
the language allows preference propositions of both types (objective and subjective).
Observe that we do not require here the strict counterpart of the consistency axiom, namely
that f  g would imply f ^ g. Given the representation that we have in mind, this condition
is somewhat less compelling: f  g means that it is established that f is as good as g, and
that the converse is not established. But it does not mean that f was proven to be better than
g { the possibility of equivalence cannot be ruled out. Hence, a thoughtful decision maker may
admit that f  g but still hesitate to strictly prefer f to g.
2.5.2 Caution
Caution: For g 2 F and f 2 Fc, g 6% f implies f ^ %g.
This axiom implies that the decision maker in question is rather averse to ambiguity. Com-
paring a potentially uncertain act g and a constant (risky) act f, the decision maker rst checks
whether there are compelling reasons to prefer g to f. If there are, namely, g % f, the axiom is
vacuous (and g^ %f would follow from Consistency). If, however, no such reasons can be found,
the decision maker would opt for the risky act over the uncertain one.
This ambiguity aversion content of the Caution axiom clearly emerges in Theorem 3, which
shows that in our derivation Caution implies that ^ % satises the Uncertainty Aversion axiom.19
Observe that the decision maker may nd that there are compelling reasons to strictly prefer
the risky act, that is, it may be the case that f  g. In this case Caution would imply f ^ %g,
as would Consistency. However, the import of the Caution axiom is in completing preferences
when pure reason cannot do the job. That is, if objective reasoning can neither suggest that f
is preferred to g nor vice versa, then Caution can be invoked to settle the matter by opting for
the sure thing.
19In fact, in Theorem 3 the maxmin representation is derived without assuming the Uncertainty Aversion
axiom. Since the representation implies the Uncertainty Aversion axiom, the latter is then implied by the other
axioms in part (i) of Theorem 3. The only one among these axioms that relates to uncertainty aversion is indeed
the Caution axiom.
17This axiom is quite extreme in its aversion to uncertainty. See the discussion in Subsection
3.2.
Observe also that Caution diers from the other axioms in that it does not lend itself to
a natural description in rst order logic. Its antecedent, g 6% f, is interpreted as \there does
not exist a proof that g is at least as good as f". Such a statement is beyond the scope of
the simple preference propositions we were referring to in the discussion of the other axioms.
However, the practical meaning of Caution is quite intuitive. We can imagine a process by
which the consultant works with the decision maker and builds the relation % as best they
can. At some point, they nd that they ran out of preferences that can be inferred from already
existing ones and the AA axioms. At this point it is meaningful to compare any g to any risky
f and complete the relation between them according to Caution.
2.5.3 Result
Theorem 3 The following are equivalent:
(i) % satises the Basic Conditions, C-Completeness, and Independence, ^ % satises the Ba-






(ii) There exist a non-empty closed and convex set C of probabilities on  and a non-constant
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Furthermore, in this case C is unique and u is cardinally unique.
Notice that we do not need to assume that ^ % satises Uncertainty Aversion. In fact, its
connection with % through Caution already guarantees that ^ % satises this property. In other
words, Caution can be viewed as \fully" capturing uncertainty aversion in this dual setting.
For this reason, Theorem 3 can be also viewed as providing a novel foundation for the
maxmin representation (5), based on the interplay of the two preferences % and ^ %.
Remark 2 Consider the following, stronger version of Caution:
(a) For g 2 F and f 2 Fc, g 6% f implies f ^ g.
Conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 3 are equivalent to the following:
(iii) % satises the conditions (i) of Theorem 1, ^ % satises Preorder, Archimedean Continu-
ity, and Completeness. Jointly, they satisfy Consistency and the above condition (a).
183 Discussion
3.1 Observability
One of the goals of characterization theorems as those presented above is to relate theoretical
concepts to observable ones. For instance, Theorems 1 and 2 can be viewed as relating an
observable relation { % and ^ %, respectively { to a utility function and a set of probability
measures such that these mathematical constructs represent the observable relation via an
appropriate condition. Adopting this view, one may ask, which is the revealed preference
relation, % or ^ %?
It is probably best to interpret our results as suggesting that both % and ^ % are observable,
though not necessarily through choice behavior alone. Consider a decision maker who consults
with experts. After a series of discussions, the decision maker writes down the preferences of
which she is sure, %. If this relation is complete, she is done. If not, she seeks to complete
her preferences and generate ^ %. Alternatively, one may consider the advice of several experts,
and view % as the relation that reects the unanimity among them, whereas ^ % designates the
eventual preference, which may be a result of compromise. Viewed thus, both relations % and
^ % are observable, though \observability" includes the possibility of preferences being stated,
not only revealed through action.
Extending the notion of observability beyond pure choice data seems essential for the dis-
cussion of incomplete preference, as well as the process by which preferences are generated.
Indeed, a pure revealed preference approach would hold that, since choice is eventually made,
incompleteness cannot be observed.20 If we wish to discuss incomplete preferences, and the
process by which preferences are formed, that is, a model in which incomplete preferences be-
come complete, we need to formally refer to other entities beyond the nal choices that are
observed.
Our main goal, however, is not to represent preferences for their use in descriptive models,
but to enrich the language in which the dialog between the policymaker and her advisors is
conducted. That is, our main application is normative in spirit. We do not think of the
economist as an outsider observer, analyzing data generated by \black-box" decision makers,
but as an expert whose advice is sought in an open discussion. In this interpretation, the
various axioms imposed on % and on ^ % are not viewed as scientic conditions to be tested for
their descriptive accuracy, but as reasoning templates or inference rules, to be used in an open
discussion between the expert and the decision maker.
Having said that, we mention that if we observe only the decision maker's nal choice, ^ %,
20Completeness in fact means a little more than that a certain choice has been observed. It also implies that
the same choice is expected to be observed in similar choice situations. But if the repeated choice is modeled
formally, it is again not obvious how incompleteness can be observed.
Danan and Ziegelmeyer (2006), for example, propose an interesting revelation approach to incompleteness by
allowing subjects to postpone their commitment to alternatives at a small cost.
19under the assumptions of Theorem 3, % is also indirectly observable. In fact, GMM (2004)
showed that, in this case,21
f %
 g i f + (1   )h^ %g + (1   )h 8 2 [0;1];h 2 F:
We discuss the relationship between the two papers in subsection 3.6.
3.2 Extremity of the maxmin rule
The Caution axiom is rather extreme. It says that, when an uncertain act is compared to a
risky one, unless we know for sure that the former dominates the latter, we should prefer the
latter. If, for example, we have no information whatsoever, so that the entire simplex (S) is
considered possible, we may set C = (S). In this case the relation % corresponds to weak
dominance, and ^ % { to the maxmin rule (without probabilities). Consider an act g such that
Eg(s)u = 1 for all s 6= s0, and Eg(s0)u =  " for some state s0 and a small " > 0. Let f be a
constant act with expected utility of zero. Act g has a higher expected utility than does f for
almost all priors in C = (S). Still, for some priors the expected utility of g is below that of
f, and Caution dictates that f be preferred to g.
This extreme nature of Caution is reected in the extremity of the maxmin rule, when the
set of probabilities C is interpreted as representing \hard evidence". Indeed, it has often been
argued that evaluating an act f by its worst-case expected utility is unreasonable.
However, the set C in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is derived from preferences. It need
not coincide with a set of probabilities that are externally given to the decision maker. The
set C is dened in behavioral terms, as a representation of a binary relation ^ %, and it need
not coincide with any cognitive notion of a set of probabilities. Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and
Vergnaud (GHTV, 2007) study the maxmin model given dierent sets of objectively provided
information, and axiomatize a maxmin rule with respect to a class of probabilities that is a
subset of the probabilities provided to the decision maker. That is, their model allows the set of
probabilities derived from observed behavior to be a strict subset of the set that is cognitively
available.
By contrast, if we think of objective rationality as a cognitive concept, and, specically, view
% as the preferences that are justied by all probabilities that are considered possible, then
Caution does take a strict interpretation of the set of priors, identifying the set of measures
used in the maxmin rule with the set of measures used to dene objective rationality.
It follows that one may consider alternatives to the axiom of Caution. Simply dropping the
axiom allows a representation of % by one set of probabilities, C, as in (6), and a representation
of ^ % by another set of probabilities, C, as in (7), where C  C (see the proof of Theorem 3
in the appendix). One may formulate alternative axioms that will correspond to the way that
the decision maker selects a subset of priors C as in GHTV (2007).
21A similar identication result was proposed by Klaus Nehring in a talk in 1996.
20Another possible direction would be to impose dierent axioms on subjective rationality,
^ %. For example, one may assume that this relation involves some aggregation of expected
utilities based on second-order probabilities, as in Klibano, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) or
Seo (2007).
Yet another possibility is to assume that the decision maker's notion of internal consistency
is structured enough to make ^ % an Anscombe-Aumann relation. That is, subjectively rational
decisions can be elaborate enough to allow subjective expected utility representation. One
obvious way to do so would be for the decision maker to choose a prior out of the set C, and to
maximize expected utility with respect to this prior. In fact, any other way of complying with
Anscombe-Aumann axioms and Consistency is observationally equivalent to such a selection of
a prior.
We believe that Consistency is a fundamental axiom. In fact, it may be viewed as part of
the denition of % and ^ %: if the former does not imply the latter, it is not clear that these
relations can be thought of as objective and subjective rationality of the same decision maker.
By contrast, the other axioms presented here should be viewed as examples. One may consider
dierent axioms on % and on ^ %, and certainly also alternatives to the axiom of Caution.
3.3 Rationality
The term \rationality" has been used in many ways. Economic theory tends to identify it with
constrained optimization of a utility function, and of expected utility in face on uncertainty.
(See Arrow, 1986.) The tradition in philosophy, by contrast, holds that rationality should mean
much more than internal consistency.22 Psychologists, on the other hand, have challenged the
concept as too strong to describe human behavior. Simon (1957) introduced the concept of
\bounded rationality", and Kahneman and Tversky (1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974,
1981) famously showed failures of basic axioms of rationality. Whereas descriptive failures
of rationality need not imply that the concept should be weakened, many authors feel that
rationality should be dened in a way that makes in an attainable goal. In particular, both
Aumann (1962) and Bewley (2002) argue that there is nothing irrational in having incomplete
preferences. Similarly, Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2004) challenge Savage's axioms
as too demanding.
We suggest to dene rationality in a way that may simplify the theoretical discussion of
decisions and its interaction with actual decisions. A useful denition of rationality would help
us distinguish situations in which an expert, or a decision theorist can change the minds of
the decision makers she addresses, from situations in which decision makers nd the theory
irrelevant. For example, decision makers who are sensitive to framing eects (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981) tend to be embarrassed when their decisions are explained to them, and they
22Some modern philosophical essays are closer to the economic notion of rationality. See, for example, Weirich
(2007), who oers a discussion of dierent notions of rationality in the context of group decisions.
21wish to change these decisions. Thus, a decision theorist can convince such decision makers in
the normative appeal of classical decision theory, which can help avoid the pitfalls of framing
eects. By contrast, chess players who fail to play chess optimally are rarely embarrassed by
this fact. We may dub them irrational, or boundedly rational, but no matter how badly we
insult them, they will not change their behavior, simply because they cannot gure out the
optimal strategies in chess.
Following this pragmatic line of thought, Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) suggested to use
the term \rationality" as follows: a mode of behavior is irrational for a decision maker if,
when exposed to the analysis of her behavior, the decision maker feels embarrassed, or wishes
to change her choices, and so forth. Clearly, this denition is subjective and qualitative. A
mode of behavior might be rational for some decision makers, and not to others. Moreover,
less intelligent decision makers may fail to understand the analysis of their choices, or the
abstract reasoning involved in certain axioms, and may therefore not exhibit any regret or
embarrassment. As a result, they may appear more rational than intelligent decision makers
who make the same decisions, but can understand why these decisions are not coherent.
It may appear unfair that, according to this denition, it is easier to be rational if one is less
intelligent. But our point of view is that the term \rationality" should not be used as a medal
of honor, bestowed upon smart decision makers. Rather, our denitions should facilitate the
discussion between decision makers, experts, and decision theorists. As such, the denition of
rationality suggested above helps categorize observed deviations from classical decision theory.
If a deviation is irrational, explaining the theory may change behavior, and thus the theory
may be useful as a normative one. If, on the other hand, no amount of explanation helps, the
theory is not very successful as a normative one, and the theorist should better accept that
fact, and devise a more acceptable one. The denition of rationality may thus help us decide
what we should do, as theorists, in the face of descriptive failures of the theory, in a way that
retains the ultimate sovereignty of the decision maker.
The concept of \rationality" in Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) corresponds to subjective
rationality in the present context. A decision maker who is embarrassed by the analysis of her
decisions is not subjectively rational; she can be convinced to change her decisions. How can
she be so embarrassed? The present paper suggests two ways: rst, her decisions may not be
internally coherent, as in the case of cyclical preferences. The axioms on ^ % are supposed to rule
out these internally incoherent patterns of choice. Second, the decisions may appear ridiculous
because they are at odds with evidence and basic reasoning, that is, they do not satisfy external
coherence. The consistency axiom guarantees that this will not be the case: if there is strong
evidence that f is preferred to g, namely, f % g, then we also require f ^ %g.
In this context, the present paper renes the denition of rationality by adding the notion of
objective rationality. Imagining a dialogue between a decision maker and her advisor, a mode
of behavior is subjectively rational if the advisor cannot convince the decision maker to change
it. It is objectively rational if the advisor can convince the decision maker to adopt it. One
22should expect that there will be a grey area between the two, namely that certain modes of
behavior will not be irrational enough to be discarded, yet not rational enough to be adopted.
The two notions of rationality may be applied to other contexts as well. In particular, one
may delve into the structure of the relation % and ask what does it mean to \prove", based
on evidence, scientic reasoning, and so forth, that one act is preferred to another. How should
evidence be used in such a \proof"? Are there more or less rational ways to interpret and
use data for inference? Should one perhaps have a collection of objectively rational relations,
depending on one's degree of certainty in a \proof", as there are degrees of signicance in
hypotheses testing? Such questions are beyond the scope of the present paper.
3.4 Objectivity
The term \objectivity" should be understood in the context of decision and economic theory in
the 20th century. The theory assumes that both utility and probability can only be subjective
terms, and no reference to a \truly" objective reality is ever made in it. Anscombe and Aumann
(1963) assumed that all probabilities are subjective, and used the term \objective" to refer to
a probability measure that is shared by all individuals considered. That is, they used the term
\objective" where authors in other disciplines would have used \intersubjective" at most.
Our denition of \objectivity" (as in Gilboa and Schmeidler, 2001) requires more than a
potentially coincidental agreement among subjective terms. We assume that a view is objective
if it is held by the relevant individuals, and if they believe that other, \reasonable" individuals
would also share this view. Thus, \objectivity" means an agreement that is not coincidental,
and that is believed to be a view than others would be convinced of.
Clearly, it remains a matter of subjective judgment whether another person is \reasonable"
and whether such a reasonable person would indeed be convinced of a particular view. Thus,
our notion of \objectivity" remains ultimately subjective. But this subjective assessment is at
a higher order of belief, that is, a belief about the beliefs that others would hold.
3.5 Incompleteness of tastes and of beliefs
This paper deals with \incompleteness of beliefs", namely, with incompleteness of preferences
that is due only to the absence of information, for which the decision maker does not know
what the probabilities of various states of the world are. The completeness axiom has also
been challenged under certainty, due to the fact that the decision maker simply may not have
well-dened preferences. This type of incompleteness, which may be dubbed \incompleteness
of tastes", includes the models by Aumann (1962), Kannai (1963), and, more recently, Ok
(2002), Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004), and Mandler (2005). Ok, Ortoleva, and Riella
(2008) suggest a model in which there is both incompleteness of tastes and of beliefs.
Incompleteness of tastes is explicitly excluded by our C-Completeness assumption. Observe
23that, in principle, one might reduce incompleteness of tastes to incompleteness of beliefs. In
some cases, such a reduction is rather intuitive. For example, suppose that a decision maker
is about the rent a car, and is oered a choice between two models at the same cost. One is
smaller and easier to park, the other is more convenient for long trips. The decision maker
may nd the choice dicult to make, partly because she is unsure about her travel plans, the
amount of time she will spend in the car due to trac jams, and so forth. In this case it is
natural to argue that the \certain" outcome of a car is, in fact, an uncertain act, providing
dierent degrees of well-being at various states of the world.
In principle, such a reduction can always be performed, by introducing a \well-being" func-
tion whose maximization is tautologically the objective of the decision maker, and by modeling
outcomes that cannot be ranked as acts whose outcomes are not known. But such a reduction
is not always very intuitive. For example, suppose that a decision maker is at a restaurant she
knows well, and she has to make a choice between a steak or a lobster. She is not concerned
with long-term eects of this choice, nor does she have any meaningful uncertainty about the
quality of the two dishes. She simply can't decide what she feels like having. In such a case,
reduction of incompleteness of tastes to incompleteness of beliefs may not generate the most
convenient or most intuitive model.
Our general approach, and, in particular, the two denitions of rationality, may apply to
incompleteness of tastes as well. Indeed, the analysis above may benet from generalizations
to deal with incompleteness of preferences that derives both from incompleteness of beliefs and
of tastes.
3.6 Related literature
GMM (2004) model a preference relation ^ % which may exhibit non-neutrality to ambiguity, and
they derive from it a relation that captures \unambiguous preferences". This relation, which
they also denote by %, is incomplete whenever ^ % fails to satisfy the independence axiom.
Moreover, when ^ % is a maxmin expected utility relation, % turns out to be a unanimity
relation with respect to the same set of priors.
The present paper is very close to GMM (2004) in terms of the mathematical structure, and
we have indeed relied on GMM's derivation of the unanimity rule (as opposed to the earlier
work by Bewley, 2002). However, the emphasis is slightly dierent. In our case, both ^ % and
% are assumed as primitive relations, and the focus is on the relationships between them, as
a step in the direction of modeling the reasoning process behind the completion of % to a
subjectively rational, but complete order ^ %. If, for instance, one were to replace Caution by
the axiom that ^ % satises independence, the derived relation % in GMM would equal ^ %. By
contrast, our model would still distinguish between subjective and objective rationality, and
may be used to discuss the process by which a particular prior (corresponding to ^ %) is selected
out of the set of possible priors (corresponding to %).
24Nehring (2000, 2008) also discusses the tension between the inability to have complete
preferences that are rationally derived, and the need to make decisions. His model also deals
with a pair of relations and the connection between them. In particular, he suggests that
\contexts" can be used to choose a way of completing a relation, and has an axiom similar to
our Consistency.
Formally, our unanimity representation result for %, though independent, is very similar
to Girotto and Holzer (2005): the setup is slightly dierent and the proof is simpler.
Rubinstein (1988) discusses preferences between simple lotteries, each guaranteeing a mon-
etary prize x with a probability p, and 0 with probability (1   p). He assumes two similarity
relations, one on the interval of monetary prizes, and the other { on the interval of probabili-
ties, and imposes a certain coherence between the preferences over lotteries and these similarity
relations. Our approach is similar to Rubinstein's (1988) in that we assume more than one
preference relation as primitive, in an attempt to gain some insight into the process by which
preferences are generated. The two models deal, however, with dierent problems.
Another model that starts out with more than one relation is proposed by Mandler (2005).
He suggests to distinguish between \psychological preferences", which may be incomplete, and
\revealed preferences", which are complete but may be intransitive. Our decision maker is
closer to standard rationality assumptions in two ways: rst, the incomplete preferences we
assume are due to absence of information, or the inability to reject hypotheses. Second, the
complete preferences in our model are supposed to be \subjectively" rational, and, in particular,
transitive.
Danan (2006) also deals with two relations, cognitive and behavioral. Cognitive strict
preference results in behavioral preference, but cognitive indierence might still be observed
as a choice of a particular alternative, and thus appear as strict preference. In his language,
our focus is on incompleteness of cognitive preferences. That is, we do not deal with the gap
between the \true" preferences and their revelation in choice behavior, but with the problem
of generating preferences in the rst place.
254 Appendix: Proofs and related material
B0() is the vector space generated by the indicator functions of the elements of , endowed
with the supnorm. We denote by ba() the set of all bounded, nitely additive set functions
on , and by () the set of all probabilities on . As it is well known, ba(), endowed with
the total variation norm, is isometrically isomorphic to the norm dual of B0(), in this case
the weak* topology, w, of ba() coincides with the event-wise convergence topology.
Given a non singleton interval K in the real line (whose interior is denoted K) we denote by
B0(;K) the subset of the functions in B0() taking values in K. Clearly, B0() = B0(;R).
We recall that a binary relation & on B0(;K) is:
 a preorder if it is reexive and transitive;
 continuous if 'n &  n for all n 2 N, 'n ! ' and  n !   imply ' &  ;
 Archimedean if the sets f 2 [0;1] : '+(1 )  & g and f 2 [0;1] :  & '+(1 ) g
are closed in [0;1] for all '; ; 2 B0(;K);
 ane if for all '; ; 2 B0(;K) and  2 (0;1), ' &   i '+(1 ) &  +(1 );
 monotonic if '    implies ' &  ;
 non-trivial if there exists ';  2 B0(;K) such that ' &   but not   & '.
Proposition 1 (GMM, 2004, Proposition A.1) For i = 1;2, let Ci be nonempty subsets
of () and &i be the relations dened on B0(;K) by






 dp 8p 2 Ci:
Then






 dp 8p 2 co
w
(Ci);
and the following statements are equivalent:






S 'dp  infP2C1
R
S 'dp for all ' 2 B0(;K).
Proposition 2 (GMM, 2004, Proposition A.2) & is a non-trivial, continuous, ane, and
monotonic preorder on B0(;K) if and only if there exists a non-empty subset C of () such
that






 dp 8p 2 C: (8)
Moreover, cow
(C) is the unique weak* closed and convex subset of () representing & in the
sense of Eq. (8).
264.1 Lemmas
To prove our results we need some lemmas.
Lemma 1 If K = R and & is a preorder, then & is ane i ' &   implies ' +  &   + 
for all  2 B0() and all  2 R+.
Proof. If & is ane and ' &  , then for all  2 B0() we have

























(  + 2) =   + :
While if   0 and per contra ' 6&  , it cannot be  = 0;1. If  2 (0;1), we have
' + (1   )0 6&   + (1   )0,




















0 =  ;
which is absurd.
Conversely, it is obvious that '; ; 2 B0(),  2 (0;1), and ' &   imply '+(1 ) &











(  + (1   )) +
   1

 =  :

Lemma 2 If & is an ane preorder on B0(;K), then there exists a unique ane preorder &]
on B0() that coincides with & on B0(;K). Moreover, if & is monotonic (resp. Archimedean),
then &] is monotonic (resp. Archimedean) too.
Proof. Suppose rst 0 2 K. We begin with a Claim:
Claim. Given any ';  2 B0(;K), the following facts are equivalent:
(i) ' &  ;
(ii) there exists  > 0 such that ';  2 B0(;K) and ' &  ,
(iii) ' &   for all  > 0 such that ';  2 B0(;K).
27Proof of the Claim. (i))(ii) and (iii))(i) are obvious. We show (ii))(iii). By (ii), there exists



















0 =  ;
i.e., ' &  . Therefore, if (iii) does not hold, there exists  >  > 0 such that ';  2



















0 =  ;
a contradiction. 
If ';  2 B0(), set ' &]   () ' &   for some  > 0 such that ';  2 B0(;K). By
the Claim, &] is a well dened binary relation on B0(), which coincides with & on B0(;K).
Moreover, ' &]   if and only if ' &   for all  > 0 such that ';  2 B0(;K). Next we
show that &] is an ane preorder (monotonic if & is monotonic).
Since 0 2 K, then for all ' 2 B0() there exists  > 0 such that ' 2 B0(;K), reexivity
of & implies that ' & ' and ' &] '. Thus &] is reexive.
If '; ; 2 B0() are such that ' &]   and   &] , take  > 0 such that '; ; 2
B0(;K), then
' &   and   & 
thus ' &  and ' &] . Thus &] is transitive.
If '; ; 2 B0() and  2 (0;1), take  > 0 such that '; ; 2 B0(;K), then
(' + (1   )) = (') + (1   )() 2 B0(;K);
(  + (1   )) = ( ) + (1   )() 2 B0(;K):
Then
' &
]   () ' &   () (') + (1   )() & ( ) + (1   )()
() (' + (1   )) & (  + (1   ))
() ' + (1   ) &
]   + (1   ):
Thus &] is ane.
Assume now that & is monotonic. If ';  2 B0() are such that '   , take  > 0 such
that ';  2 B0(;K), then '    and monotonicity of & delivers ' &   and ' &]  .
Thus &] monotonic.
As to uniqueness, let &[ be an ane preorder on B0() that coincides with & on B0(;K).
For all ';  2 B0(), take  > 0 such that ';  2 B0(;K), then the Claim (applied to &[),
the fact that &[ coincides with & on B0(;K), and the denition of &] guarantee that
' &
[   () ' &
[   () ' &   () ' &
]  ;
28that is, &[ coincides with &] on B0().
Suppose 0 = 2 K. Given any k 2 K, for ';  2 B0(;K k) set ' &k   () '+k &  +k.
It is easy to verify that &k is an ane preorder on B0(;K k) (monotonic if & is monotonic).
Since 0 belongs to the interior of K k, by what we just proved there is a unique ane preorder
&
]
k on B0() that coincides with &k on B0(;K   k) (monotonic if & is monotonic). Such
extension coincides with & on B0(;K), and it is the unique ane preorder on B0() with this
property.
Finally, assume & is Archimedean, and denote by &] the unique ane preorder on B0()
which coincides with & on B0(;K). Notice that, by Lemma 1, if ';  2 B0() and  > 0,
 2 R are such that ' + ;  +  2 B0(;K), then
' &
]   () ' +  &
]   +  () ' +  &   + :
Now, for all '; ; 2 B0() take  > 0 and  2 R such that '+; +;+ 2 B0(;K).
For all  2 [0;1],
(' + (1   ) ) +  = (' + ) + (1   )(  + ) 2 B0(;K)
and
' + (1   )  &
]  () (' + (1   ) ) +  &  + 
() (' + ) + (1   )(  + ) &  + :
Then f 2 [0;1] : '+(1 )  &] g coincides with f 2 [0;1] : (' + )+(1 )(  + ) &
 + g which is closed since & is Archimedean. A similar argument shows that f 2 [0;1] :
 &] ' + (1   ) g is closed too. Thus &] is Archimedean. 
Lemma 3 An ane and monotonic preorder on B0(;K) is continuous if and only if it is
Archimedean.
Proof. Obviously, continuity implies the Archimedean property.
Conversely, assume & is Archimedean. Since & is monotonic and Archimedean, then the
ane preorder &] on B0() that coincides with & on B0(;K) is monotonic and Archimedean
too (Lemma 2).
If 'n &] 0 for all n 2 N and 'n ! ', let M = sups2S '(s), which is indeed a maximum.
For all " 2 (0;1) there is n such that
'n  ' + "S  ' + "((M + 1)S   '):
In fact, MS  ' implies (M + 1)S   '  S.23 Therefore, for all " 2 (0;1) there is n 2 N
such that
"[(M + 1)S] + (1   ")' = ' + "((M + 1)S   ')  'n &
] 0:
23S is the constant function taking value 1 on S.
29Monotonicity of &] delivers that, for all " 2 (0;1),
"[(M + 1)S] + (1   ")' &
] 0: (9)
But &] is Archimedean, hence the set of all " such that (9) holds is closed, and, containing
(0;1), it also contains 0, in particular ' &] 0.
Conclude that, if 'n ! ',  n !  , and 'n &]  n for all n 2 N, then 'n    n &] 0 for all
n 2 N and 'n    n ! '    ; therefore '     &] 0, that is ' &]  . Thus &] is continuous,
which immediately implies that & is continuous too. 
Now Lemma 3 and Proposition 2 deliver:
Corollary 1 & is a non-trivial, Archimedean, ane, and monotonic preorder on B0(;K) if
and only if there exists a nonempty subset C of () such that






 dp 8p 2 C: (10)
Moreover, cow
(C) is the unique weak* closed and convex subset of () representing & in the
sense of Eq. (10).
All the results we have proved so far hold more generally if B0() is replaced by any normed
Riesz space with unit.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Assume % is a preorder satisfying Monotonicity, Archimedean Continuity, Non-triviality, C-
Completeness, and Independence.
Archimedean Continuity, C-Completeness, and Independence, together with the von Neumann-
Morgenstern Expected Utility Theorem (see the axiomatics of Herstein and Milnor, 1953), imply
that there exists a cardinally unique function u : X ! R such that P % Q i EPu  EQu,
provided P;Q 2 L. Monotonicity and Non-triviality imply that u is not constant. In what
follows we write U (R) instead of ERu if R 2 L. Clearly U : L ! R is ane and non-constant.
If f 2 F then U f 2 B0 (;U (L)). Conversely, if ' 2 B0 (;U (L)), then '(s) = U (Qi) if
s 2 Ai for suitable Q1;:::;QN 2 L and a partition fA1;A2;:::;ANg of S in . Therefore, setting
f (s) = Qi if s 2 Ai we have ' = U f. We can conclude that B0 (;U (L)) = fU  f : f 2 Fg.
Moreover, U  f = U  g i U (f (s)) = U (g (s)) for all s 2 S i f (s)  g (s) for all s 2 S,
which by Monotonicity implies f  g.
For ';  2 B0 (;U (L)), set
' &
   () f %
 g for some f;g 2 F such that ' = U  f;   = U  g:
30By what we have just observed, & is well dened on B0 (;U (L)) and it is characterized by
' &
   () f %
 g for all f;g 2 F such that ' = U  f;   = U  g:
For all ' = U  f 2 B0 (;U (L)), f % f implies ' & '. Thus & is reexive.
If ' = U  f;  = U  g; = U  h 2 B0 (;U (L)), ' &   and   &  amount to f % g
and g % h, thus f % h and ' & . Thus & is transitive, and a preorder.
Since there are f;g such that f  g (by Non-triviality of %), then U  f > U  g and &
is non-trivial.
If ' = U  f;  = U  g; = U  h 2 B0 (;U (L)) and  2 (0;1), then
' &
   () f %
 g () f + (1   )h %
 g + (1   )h
() U  (f + (1   )h) &
 U  (g + (1   )h)
() ' + (1   ) &
   + (1   ):
Therefore & is ane.
If ' = U  f;  = U  g; = U  h 2 B0 (;U (L)), then
f 2 [0;1] : ' + (1   )  &
 g = f 2 [0;1] : U  (f + (1   )g) &
 U  hg
= f 2 [0;1] : f + (1   )g %
 hg
is closed in [0;1] because of Archimedean Continuity of %, and an analogous argument shows
that f 2 [0;1] :  & ' + (1   ) g is closed too. Thus & is Archimedean.
If ' = U  f;  = U  g 2 B0 (;U (L)) are such that '   , then U (f (s))  U (g (s)) for
all s 2 S. Therefore f (s) % g (s) for all s 2 S, and by Monotonicity of %, f % g, that is
' &  . Thus & is monotonic.
By Corollary 1, there exists a unique non-empty weak* closed and convex subset C of ()
such that, for ';  2 B0 (;U (L)),
' &






 dp 8p 2 C
;
therefore, for f;g 2 F,
f %
 g () U  f &
 U  g ()
Z
S
(U  f)dp 
Z
S










 dp(s) 8p 2 C
:
The rest is trivial.
Alternative Axioms: Next we call Strong Archimedean Continuity requirement (a) of Re-
mark 1 and Weak Independence requirement (b) of Remark 1. Clearly, Strong Archimedean
Continuity implies Archimedean Continuity while Shapley and Baucells (1998, Lemma 1.2)
31show that Preorder, Strong Archimedean Continuity and Weak Independence imply Indepen-
dence. Thus representation (4) holds if Archimedean Continuity and Independence are replaced
by Strong Archimedean Continuity and Weak Independence. Conversely, representation (4) im-
plies Strong Archimedean Continuity and (Weak) Independence.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Assume that
 % is a preorder satisfying Monotonicity, Archimedean Continuity, Non-triviality, C-
Completeness, and Independence;







By Theorem 1, there exist a non-empty closed and convex set C of probabilities on  and














0 g 2 F i f + (1   )h^ %g + (1   )h 8 2 [0;1];h 2 F:
Lemma 1 and Propositions 5 and 7 of GMM (2004), guarantee that there exist a non-empty
closed and convex set C of probabilities on , a non-constant function u : X ! R, and a
monotonic and constant linear functional I : B0 () ! R such that, for every f;g 2 F














Ef(s)u dp(s)  I (Efu) ; (14)
moreover, equality holds in (14) for all f 2 F if (and only if) % satises Uncertainty Aversion.
If Q;R 2 L, then, by (11), Consistency, and (12),
EQu
  ERu
 () Q %
 R =) Q^ %R () EQu  ERu:
Corollary B.3 of GMM (2004) delivers the existence of  > 0 and  2 R such that u = u+.
Wlog, u = u.
32Propositions 4 of GMM (2004) implies that %0 is the maximal (relative to the inclusion in
F F) relation on F satisfying Independence and contained in ^ %. Consistency guarantees that
% is contained in ^ %, and % satises Independence, thus
f %
 g =) f %
0 g:
(11), (13), and Proposition 1 deliver C  C.
Assume that also Caution holds. If there is g 2 F such that





then, there is Q 2 L such that


















Eg(s)u dp(s) 8f 2 F
and Proposition 1 delivers C  C.24
The rest is trivial.
Alternative Axioms: Next we call Default to Certainty the strong caution requirement (a)
of Remark 2.
Assume that
 % is a preorder satisfying Monotonicity, Archimedean Continuity, Non-triviality, C-
Completeness, and Independence;





satisfy Consistency and Default to Certainty.
By Theorem 1, there exists a non-empty closed and convex set C of probabilities on  and








Eg(s)u dp(s) 8p 2 C: (15)
Let P;Q 2 L. By Consistency
P %
 Q implies P ^ %Q.
24Since, as f ranges in F, Ef()u ranges in B0 (;K), where K is the non-trivial interval fEQu : Q 2 Lg.
33By Default to Certainty
P 
 Q implies P ^ Q.
Therefore ^ % and % coincide on L, and P 7! EPu represents both preorders on L.
In particular, ^ % satises Monotonicity, in fact, f (s) ^ %g (s) for all s 2 S implies, by what
we have just shown, f (s) % g (s) for all s 2 S, which, by Monotonicity of % implies f % g,
and Consistency delivers f ^ %g.
For all f 2 F, let P;Q 2 L be such that P ^ %f (s) ^ %Q for all s 2 S, then P ^ %f ^ %Q. By
Archimedean Continuity the sets f 2 [0;1] : P + (1   )Q^ %fg and f 2 [0;1] : f ^ %P +
(1 )Qg are closed; they are nonempty since 1 belongs to the rst and 0 to the second; their
union is the whole [0;1]. Since [0;1] is connected, their intersection is not empty, hence there
exists  2 [0;1] such that P + (1   )Q^ f. In particular, for each act f there exists Rf 2 L
such that Rf ^ f.
There are two possibilities
 f % Rf, in this case ERfu 
R






 f 6% Rf, in this case, by Default to Certainty Rf ^ f, which is absurd.
Moreover, if ERfu < minp2C
R






Ef(s)u dp(s)  EPu;
and there is  2 (0;1] such that







 P + (1   )Rf ^ Rf






for all f 2 F and all Rf 2 L such that Rf ^ f.
Finally,










The rest is trivial.
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